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ABSTRACT 
Intrusion detection systems have been widely used as "burglar alarms" in the computer 
security field. There are two major types of detection techniques: misuse detection and anomaly 
detection. Although misuse detection can detect known attacks with lower false positive rate, 
anomaly detection is capable of detecting any new or varied attempted intrusion as long as the 
attempted intrusions disturb the normal states of the systems. The network anomaly detector is 
employed to monitor a segment of network for any suspicious activities based on the sniffered 
network traffic. The fast speed of network and wide use of encryption techniques make it almost 
unpractical to read payload information for the network anomaly detector. 
This work tries to answer the question: What are the best features for network anomaly 
detector? The main experiment data sets are from 1999 DARPA Lincoln Library off-line intrusion 
evaluation project since it is still the most comprehensive public benchmark data up to today. Firstly, 
43 features of different levels and protocols are defined. Using the first three weeks as training data 
and last two weeks as testing data, the performance of the features are testified by using 5 different 
classifiers. Secondly, the feasibility of feature selection is investigated by employing some filter and 
wrapper techniques such as Correlation Feature Selection, etc. Thirdly, the effect of changing overlap 
and time window for the network anomaly detector is investigated. At last, GGobi and Mineset are 
utilized to visualize intrusion detections to save time and effort for system administrators. 
The results show the capability of our features is not limited to probing attacks and denial of 
service attacks. They can also detect remote to local attacks and backdoors. The feature selection 
techniques successfully reduce the dimensionality of the features from 43 to 10 without performance 
degrading. The three dimensional visualization pictures provide a straightforward view of normal 
network traffic and malicious attacks. The time plot of key features can be used to aid system 
administrators to quickly locate the possible intrusions. 
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
As the new techniques roll out, the number of computer break-ins and security accidents is 
skyrocketing. In 1988, the number of incidents reported to CERT® Coordination Center (CERT/CC) 
is only 6 and this number reached to 82,094 for 2002. [1] To protect the confidentiality, integrity, 
authenticity, and availability of valuable computer resources, many security mechanisms have been 
developed such as firewalls, encryption, virus protection, digital signatures, notarization, etc. 
Unfortunately, there is not a cure-all solution and 100% security is practically impossible. A 
combination of various security schemes are generally employed to make the system more secure. 
1. Intrusion detection systems 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) install "burglar alarms" into the system and give out alerts 
whenever unauthorized access attempts are detected. In his book, Amoroso defined intrusion 
detection as "the process of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing 
and networking resources". [2] 
1.1. Why intrusion detection necessary? 
Why do we need intrusion detection? Can't we just use firewall to block all malicious traffic 
and use encryption to protect information transmitted? The answer is "no". [3] 
First, the crackers are getting smarter in evolving their attacks, exploits and subversion 
methods. Some of these methods include sending a Trojan based e-mail, using scanner in stealth 
mode, etc. An attacker can mask traffic that should be screened by the firewall by encapsulating it 
within packets corresponding to another network protocol such as Internet Control Message Protocol 
and domain name system. 
Second, most of the vulnerabilities are attributed to mis-configuration of system, poorly 
engineered software, user negligence and carelessness and basic design flaws in protocols and 
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operating systems. The vulnerabilities are ever increasing and attackers are exploiting these using 
protocols such as HTTP that are allowed through most of the firewalls. 
Third, most of the "Hacker" tools are available over the Internet and can be downloaded by 
any one to use them at ease. This has reduced the technical knowledge required to attack and exposed 
the organizations to a rapidly growing number of potential attackers such as script kiddies to 
criminals. 
Fourth, there is ever-increasing misuse and malicious insider activities. This may be because 
of the lack of security organization, improper enforcement of security policies, access controls in both 
physical and system access and knowledge of local security measures. Perimeter security defenses 
such as firewall cannot protect against these insider attacks. 
Hence, an Intrusion detection system plays a key role in the security filed. 
1.2. The attacks and attackers 
In his seminal report Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance, Anderson 
defined a still-useful list of the types of mischievous actions an intruder can carry out: [ 4] 
1) Masquerading (impersonating an authorized user or a system resource, such as an e-mail 
server). 
2) Unauthorized use of resources (running a lengthy program that that eats up computing 
cycles and so keeps others from running programs). 
3) Denial of services (by, say, deliberately overloading a system with messages to keep 
others from gaining access to it). 
4) Unauthorized disclosure of information (illicitly reading or copying an individual's 
personal information, such as a credit card number, or sensitive corporate data, such as 
business plans). 
5) Unauthorized alteration of information (tinkering with file data) 
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In general, an attack is a sequence of related actions. The first step is information gathering or 
reconnaissance. The hacker chooses his target and gathers as much information as possible about the 
victim such as its network configuration, services running, operating systems, user accounts, etc. 
Once obtaining such valuable information, the hacker will try to gain access to at least one host of the 
network. This is the second step of the attack. Software exploits, password cracking, buffer overflow 
are common methods used by the hackers. Once successfully accessing to one machine, the hacker 
will use various ways to gain root privilege and do anything he wants. The final stage is usually the 
setting up of backdoors for future access and cleaning up of their trails. Of course, it is not necessary 
for the hackers to follow all the steps. For example, there are many automatic tools to search the 
network for machines with specific exploits or specific backdoors. 
It is important to know our enemies before we fight them. Who are "bad guys" in this cyber 
world? There are generally two types of hackers: script-kiddies and experienced hackers. Script-
kiddies do not know much about networks and systems but they carry out most of the attacks by using 
various kinds of readily available tools. Although the number of experienced hackers is small, they 
are the real threats to the network. Their good understanding of networks, operating systems enables 
them to perform sophisticated attacks. In addition, they always develop tools for themselves, which is 
always used by script kiddies. 
1.3. Classification of intrusion detection systems 
According to detection methods, IDSs fall into two categories: misuse detection and anomaly 
detection. Misuse detection is a kind of signature-based approach and depends on a database of 
known attack signatures to search for any matched attack. Its low false alarms and high detection 
accuracy are major advantages. However, it cannot detect new or varied attacks that are not in their 
database and needs constant update of signature databases. Most of the commercial IDSs adopt 
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misuse detection approach. Anomaly detection comes to rescue for the detection of new attacks. It 
will give alarm whenever the system deviates from its normal state. Since it does not depend on any 
known attack signature base, anomaly detection can detect any new or known attack, which makes 
system behave abnormally. 
Based on the monitored objects and information sources, IDSs can be classified into two 
types: host and network. A host IDS generally uses system audit, log files, process information, and 
CPU usage to monitor the state of a single host. Network IDS can monitor a LAN with lots of 
machines basing on network traffic, audit trails of routers. Compared with host peers, network IDSs 
have several advantages [5]: 
1) Network IDS can monitor a heterogeneous set of hosts and operating systems simultaneously 
as long as they are using TCP/IP protocols while audit trail based IDSs have only been used 
on a single operating systems. 
2) Host based IDSs always use the audit trails of the system as information source. But host 
Audit trails are often not available in a timely fashion 
3) The audit trials are often vulnerable. Crackers or hackers can tum off the system log daemons 
or change the audit trails to cover their traces. 
4) The collection of audit trails degrades the performance of a machine being monitored 
5) Many of the more seriously documented cases of computer intrusion have utilized a network 
at some point during the intrusion. 
Network anomaly detection systems monitor a segment of LAN for any attacks that cause the 
system to behave abnormally. Our aim is to develop a lightweight network anomaly detector, which 
only reads the headers of the packets. Payloads of the packets are saved for host IDSs doing a better 
job at analyzing what the payloads do to the host. Another advantage of this approach is the minimum 
processing time that can meet fast network requirement. 
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Denning [6] described a general-purpose intrusion detection expert model that was 
independent of any particular system, application environment, system vulnerability, or type of 
intrusion. The basic idea was to maintain a set of profiles for subjects. When an audit record is 
generated, the model matches it with the appropriate profile and then makes decisions on updating the 
profile, checking for abnormal behavior and reporting anomalies detected. The basic idea in this 
model appears with little modification in many systems built today. 
2. Feature selection 
Anomaly detection is based on the assumption that a compromised or attacked system shows 
considerable deviations from its normal or good state. The deviations might be degraded performance 
of the system, sudden shut down of the server, a new listening TCP port at the victim or a strange 
running process. Different attacks introduce various forms of abnormalities into the system. 
One problem is how to express the significance of the abnormality. The flexible network 
structure, various network software and hardware from different manufactures all contribute to the 
difficulty of the problem. The available information sources for network intrusion detection can be 
divided into two types: one is the audit trails of various network components such as routers, 
firewalls, web servers and sniffered network traffic, etc; the other is the sniffered network traffic. 
For network traffic analysis, a choice must be made whether to read the payloads of the 
packets or not. Protocol analysis will shed more light into what is happening to network traffic. 
However, there is a cost of computation burden and resource consumption. High speed network may 
not allow enough time to analyze protocol without dropping any packet. At the same time, network 
traffic along cannot completely reflect the real state of the host. For example, a hacker carried out a 
buffer overflow attack to the web server of the victim. It is extremely difficult to determine whether 
the attack succeeds or not by only using network traffic. So it is a good idea to leave the payload of 
the traffic to host IDSs. The headers of the packets already contain a lot of useful information. 
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Making good use of this information is a better approach than jumping to find more complex protocol 
analysis. 
One of the open questions is how to best describe the system activity. In our approach, we 
called these variables the "features" of the system, which were used to detect changes in system 
behavior. Features allow the user to discover which measurements give the most information about 
system activity. The most important issue in anomaly detection systems is: How should we choose 
features? What are good features for intrusion detection? How many features are enough? How to 
determine the features are good or bad? Good features should have high detection performance and 
low false alarms. The paper attempts to answer these questions for network anomaly detection. The 
principles of feature choice are given. Some good features for detection of attacks are derived. Their 
performance is verified with experiments. Although our focus is on network anomaly detection, this 
approach can also be applied to other types of intrusion detection. 
Then it comes to the choice of features, what features can best describe the network traffic. In 
theory, we can identify any type of suspicious activity without any false alarms if we could accurately 
describe the normal state of a system with a perfect set of features. Since there are so many potential 
features for intrusion detection, we need to reduce the number of features by finding the most useful 
features. 
Feature selection have been studied widely in machine learning community. Basically, there 
are two approaches: transformation from high dimensions to low dimensions and removing least 
significant features. The methods of second approach fall into two categories: filters and wrappers. 
Filters use heuristic methods to search the feature space for the best subset of features and has the 
benefits of fast speed and classifier independent. Wrappers, on the other hand, evaluate the worth of 
features using the learning algorithm that is to ultimately to be applied to the data. It generally has a 
better performance at the cost of computation cost. 
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3. Intrusion detection visualization 
One open problem with the IDS is false alarms. When an alert emerges, the system 
administrators must check the log files of IDS, various servers, routers, network traffic, etc. 
So much information makes this process like drinking from a fire hose. The methods to 
visually summarize the information can relieve the system administrators from the pain. 
Analyzing log files results is inherently a perceptually serial process. Interpretation of 
graphical images, on the other hand, is perceptually a parallel process [7]. Parallel processes 
can save both effort and time in comparison with serial processes. Thus, the use of graphical 
images has edges over observing individual reports. Another advantage is that more 
"concepts" can be presented in a single image. A good visualization picture can convey the 
same information in a better way and save a great deal of time and energies for the security 
personnel. The challenge is to create visual methods that clearly show the problem without 
losing information. 
The audience of these images is not limited to system administrators and security 
experts. They can serve as excellent education material for general users of computer 
systems. No matter what tools are employed in the computer systems, the security 
consciousness of the common users is always the bottleneck of the success. For example, a 
weak password that is the same as the user name could turn thousands of dollars investment 
into a waster. 
In this paper, we focus on the visualization of network intrusions. The data source the 
sniffed network traffic in TCPDUMP format. This makes our approach independent of 
different operating systems and hardware. At present, the attention is on the off-line analysis 
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of intrusions instead of real time analysis. MineSet [8] and GGobi [9] provide excellent tools 
for the visualization purpose. 
4. Literature review 
4.1. Feature selection 
In P.A. Porras and A.Valdes 's work[lO], they organize network packets into streams 
based on different isolation criteria such as discarded traffic, pass-through traffic, protocol-
specific traffic, etc. Then four classes of features were adapted to track network status: 
categorical, continuous, intensity and event distribution. These features are employed in both 
anomaly detection and signature detection. Their work provided some general guidance for 
the choice of features. However, they did not mention the performance of these features. 
The Network Security Monitor (NSM) modeled the network and hosts in a 
hierarchically structured Interconnected Computing Environment Model (ICEM) [5]. The 
ICEM is composed of six layers: packet layer, thread layer, connection layer, host layer, 
connected-network layer and system layer. They listed the features for connection layer and 
host layer. Lee used neural networks to implement anomaly detection. [11] He gave a list of 
features for the detections of SYN flood, fast SYN port scan and "stealthy" SYN port scan. 
Dickerson [12] gives a long list of features extracted from TCP, UDP and ICMP. However, 
none of them specify why they choose these features and no further analysis of these features 
is given. 
These simple features might not be enough. [13] It might be better to consider the 
relationship between the simple features such as frequency episode, association rules. That is 
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the reason why data mining technologies have been introduced into intrusion detection field. 
In Lee and Stolfo's work, they combined the features derived from frequency episodes and 
intrinsic connection features. But their model is based on misuse detection. Audit Data 
Analysis and Mining (ADAM) system is a anomaly detection system which used a 
combination of association rules mining and classification to discover attacks in a 
TCPDUMP audit trail [14]. One of the remaining problems is that they cannot detect attacks 
with small number of packets. 
No one give a complete analysis of how to apply the specific rules to choose the 
features. Nor did anyone benchmark the performance of the different features. How will the 
features influence the performance? 
4.2. Intrusion detection visualization 
Although great efforts have been devoted to intrusion detection system development, 
little attention has been paid to visual analysis. One of main obstacles is that there are too 
many variables and too much data from different sources such as IDS log, system log, sniffed 
network, etc. Many systems use a simple "odometer-like" or metered scale to indicate the 
estimated level of attack a system is enduring. This approach is simple but do not provide 
adequate details to do more than observe that attacks are in progress. Another problem is that 
the level of threat shown is based on the IDS analysis. The false alarms greatly reduce its 
credibility. 
Earlier system, such as Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS), provided 
graphical representations in the form of color to indicate when a system had experienced a 
sequence of suspicious events [15]. Frincke has performed preliminary investigations 
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towards identifying likely models for depicting system state. Erbache and Frincke 
development a glyph based environment that can be updated continuously for constant real-
time monitoring of the network environment [16,17]. The environment consists of intrusion 
detection visualization part and bandwidth usage visualization part. The power of glyphs is to 
represent a vast number of parameters as visual attributes. But too many glyphs introduce 
another problem: the difficulty of interpretation and too much clutter. 
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CHAPTER 2 FUZZY FEATURE EXTRACTION AND 
VISUALIZATION FOR INTRUSION DETECTION 
A paper published in the lzth IEEE International conference on Fuzzy Systems 2003 
Jianqiang Xin, John E. Dickerson, and Julie A. Dickerson 
Abstract 
The Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine (FIRE) is a network intrusion detection 
system that uses fuzzy systems to assess malicious activity against computer networks. A key 
part of an intrusion detection system is the selection of key features that can characterize the 
state of the network. This work uses interactive data visualization to analyze the features of 
several different intrusion detection scenarios using the DARPA Lincoln Laboratory test 
data. Visualizing the data helps to characterize which features are key for identifying 
intrusions and if they can be characterized as fuzzy sets or by Boolean variables. These 
inputs can then be input into a fuzzy cognitive map that serves to fuse the inputs to detect 
more complex attacks. 
This work was supported by grant #EIA0074919 from the National Science 
1. Introduction 
With the widespread use of computer networks, the number of computer break-ins 
and security incidents is skyrocketing as well. Computer security protects the confidentiality, 
integrity, authenticity, and availability of computer resources. Amoroso defined intrusion 
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detection as "the process of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at 
computing and networking resources" [ 1]. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) fall into two general categories: misuse detection 
and anomaly detection. Misuse detection usually involves a signature-based approach that 
matches measured data against a database of known attacks. Misuse detection systems cannot 
detect new or varied attacks that are not in the database and need constant updates of 
signature databases. Most commercial IDSs adopt a misuse detection approach. Anomaly 
detection is based on the assumption that malicious activity will leave a history of abnormal 
activity. It can detect any new attacks that make the systems behave strangely. 
Based on the monitored objects and information sources, IDSs can be classified into 
two types: host and network. Network anomaly detection systems monitor a segment of a 
local area network (LAN) for any attacks that cause the system to behave abnormally. The 
network anomaly detector should rely mainly on the header information of the packets. 
Payloads of the packets are saved for host IDSs, which do a better job at analyzing what the 
payloads do to the host. 
Denning [2] described a general-purpose intrusion detection expert model that was 
independent of any particular system, application environment, system vulnerability, or type 
of intrusion. The basic idea was to maintain a set of profiles for subjects. When an audit 
record is generated, the model matches it with the appropriate profile and then makes 
decisions on updating the profile, checking for abnormal behavior and reporting anomalies 
detected. This is the model used in the Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine (FIRE) system 
[3, 4]. 
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Introduced by Professor Lotfi Zadeh in the mid-1960's, fuzzy logic was based on the 
idea of partial set membership instead of requiring a data element to be either a member or 
non-member of a set. In fuzzy logic, the truth of any statement is a matter of degree [5]. 
Fuzzy logic works well for problems in intrusion detection for the reasons given below. 
• Most of the features for anomaly detection are quantitative. If the feature is 
within the normal range, everything is fine. Otherwise, there is something 
wrong. A large threshold will reduce false alarms but it may miss some 
attacks. A small threshold may increase the detection rate at the cost of high 
false alarms. In a fuzzy system each feature is abnormal by a degree. 
• Fuzzy systems can readily combine inputs from widely varying sources. Not 
all attacks can be detected by only one feature. The correlation of several 
features will reveal more about the attack. For example, the attacker used 
nmap tool to probe the victim network. The combination of TCP, UDP and 
ICMP features will surely give a better result than any single type of features. 
• It is easier to incorporate the security expertise into the fuzzy system. Since 
the foundation of the fuzzy systems are IF-THEN rules. Security experts can 
rapidly develop these rules using a causal data structure called Fuzzy 
Cognitive Maps. 
2. System description 
2.1. Fuzzy intrusion recognition engine 
FIRE is a distributed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) using independent fuzzy 
agents working collectively. An agent monitors one or more data elements, maintains a local 
history of past observations, and reports abnormal behavior to a transceiver. Monitors in the 
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form of fuzzy cognitive maps combine reports from transceivers, correlate data, and send 
alarms or reports to the User Interface. Figure 2-1 shows the structure of the FIRE system. 
Note that each agent may track and report several different data elements. 
Several agents were developed for FIRE [3, 4]: 
TCPconn Agent - Monitors TCP connections between hosts on the network looking 
for unusual connection patterns. 
UDPconn Agent - Looks for unusual traffic involving UDP data. 
ICMPconn Agent - Monitors ICMP traffic. 
PortAgent - Monitors which ports are in service on the network and watches for 
unusual services and service/host combinations. 
Networl<.Data 
Collector 
(NDC) 
a local area network 
Fuzzy Threat 
Analyzer 
(FTA) 
~--~ 
----" ~ 
'--V 
~Fuzzy Inputs 
Network Data u;J Network Data 
Collector q raw q Processor 
(NDC) data (NDP) 
another local area network 
Figure 2-1. FIRE architecture: A FIRE system includes one or more data collection units and network data 
processors, plus one or more Fuzzy Threat Analyzers that combine responses from the agents into higher-level 
rules. 
Choosing the best data elements to monitor in the network stream is critical to the 
effectiveness of the intrusion detection system. Since FIRE is intended to operate on the 
network packet header data rather than the contents of network packets. FIRE concentrates 
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on the three main internet protocols: TCP, UDP, and ICMP. The system monitors all traffic 
during a two minute sliding collection window. 
2.2. Lincoln Laboratory test data set 
Benchmarking of commercial and research IDSs is necessary for understanding 
system performance. To meet this challenge, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) conducted consecutive offline evaluations of its intrusion detection 
projects consecutively in 1998 and 1999 [6]. More complex attack scenarios were created in 
the 2000 evaluation [7]. It is still the most comprehensive offline evaluation of different 
intrusion detection systems. 
MIT's Lincoln Laboratory set up a controlled network environment containing 
hundreds of users and thousands of hosts. Custom software automata simulated 
programmers, secretaries, managers and other types of users running common UNIX and 
Windows NT application programs. More than 200 instances and 56 different types of 
attacks were embedded in the 1999 evaluation. They fall into five major categories: [6] 
• Probe or scan attacks 
• Denial of service (DoS) attacks 
• Remote to Local (R2L) attacks 
•User to root (U2R) attacks 
• Data attacks 
The data set is divided into two parts: training data and testing data. Three weeks of 
training data composed of two weeks of background traffic with no attacks and one week of 
background with a few attacks. The two weeks of testing data contained many different 
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attacks. Those attacks which also appeared in the training data were labeled as old attacks; 
while those that existed in the testing data were designated new attacks. Additionally, when 
an attempt was made to veil an attack, it was labeled as stealthy; otherwise it was labeled as 
clear. 
3. Feature selection 
The network anomaly detector only looked at header information of the packets. This 
approach saves the work of analyzing numerous types of protocols at the application layer. 
The attacks that this approach can detect include probe attacks, denial of service attacks and 
maybe some remote to local attacks. 
Since probes and denial of service attacks usually generate large amounts of network 
traffic in a short period, these attacks can be detected by the number of events within a time 
interval. The choice of time interval depends on the purpose of intrusion detection. A shorter 
time interval will give alarms in a more real time fashion but requires more computation and 
storage. A larger time interval will have a detection delay, but it can save computation time 
and resources. Since this analysis is off-line for feature analysis, speedy detection is not 
necessary. The time interval in our experiments is 2 minutes. 
Good features should tell us whether the network traffic is normal or not. The features 
need to be general enough so that they can detect new attacks or variations of old attacks. 
The features should be efficient at describing the network traffic flow. Good features are 
those that give us the most useful information. The features should generate high detection 
rate with low false alarms. They should accurately describe the network normal state. 
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The features were chosen based on an analysis of existing attack types and a 
statistical analysis and data visualization of the Lincoln Labs Test Data Set. The following 
features were selected: 
• Number of Abnormal Packets: The checks include whether the source Internet 
Protocol (IP) address is same as the destination IP address, whether the source IP address or 
destination IP address falls into the reserved IP address class, etc. 
• Number of Transaction Control Protocol (TCP) Connections 
•Number of Failed TCP Connections 
•Number of Destination Ports 
• Number of UDP Packets 
• Number of Wrong Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets 
•Number of New ARP packets 
• Number of Internet Connection Management Protocol (ICMP) packets 
• Number of Unreachable ICMP packets 
• Number of Misaligned fragmentation packet 
•Number of Bytes Sent per Connection 
•Number of Bytes Received per Connection 
• Number of new Source-Destination Ports (SDPs): A SDP is derived from a TCP 
connection. It is defined as (source IP address, destination IP address, destination Port). 
•Number of new servers: A server is derived from successful TCP connections and is 
defined as (destination IP address, destination Port) 
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4. Feature visualization 
4.1. Description of MineSet and GGobi 
Developed by Silicon Graphics Inc., MineSet is an interactive system for data mining. 
It supports the knowledge discovery process from data access and preparation through 
iterative analysis and visualization to deployment. It provides an interactive three-
dimensional environment for the display of high-dimensional data [8]. These features make 
MineSet an excellent tool to analyze network intrusion data. In addition to showing the data 
in three dimensions, MineSet can also be employed to mine the data for useful information. It 
provides us with many means for data visualization, analysis and mining. Unfortunately, 
MineSet is only available in Silicon Graphics Inc. (SGI) machines and SGI has stopped its 
support for MineSet. 
The open source high-dimensional visualization program, GGobi, is a data 
visualization system with state-of-the-art interactive and dynamic methods for the 
manipulation of views of data (www.ggobi.org). Its functionality includes 2-D displays of 
projections of points and edges in high dimensional spaces, scatter plot matrices, parallel 
coordinate and time series plots. Points can be labeled and brushed with glyphs and colors. 
One of its powerful tools is the "grand tour" which provides dynamic 2-D projections of high 
dimensional space [9, 10]. Its direct output is a smooth animation for viewing all of data 
space [11]. These characteristics make GGobi an excellent candidate for the visualization of 
network intrusion detection. 
4.2. Visualization approach and results 
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This work concentrates on TCP packets. It is meaningful to analyze TCP packets in 
the units of connections instead of separate packets. Bro is an open-source tool for generic 
connection analysis (12). In this study, the Bro source code was changed to replace service 
ID with destination port. The source data is the sniffed network traffic in the TCPDUMP 
format of Lincoln Laboratory. The individual connection of Bro analyzer output is as the 
following: 
<start> <duration> <destination port> Bo Br Al Ar <state> 
The meaning of the fields is listed in TABLE 2-1. 
TABLE 2-1. The meaning of TCP connection field 
Name Meaning 
Start the connection's start time 
Duration the connection's duration 
destination port the destination port of the connection, generally an indication of service 
Bo, B, the number of bytes sent by the originator and responder 
the local and remote addresses that 
Ai,A, participated in the connection 
respectively 
State the state of the connection at the time the summary was written. 
Following the above approach, all the TCP packets are extracted into TCP 
connections that have eight fields. One simple way is to display all eight dimensional data 
into a single picture to investigate their relationship. The grand tour in GGobi gives a 
continuous animation of the projections of 8-dimensional space to 2-D space. Figure 2-2 
gives a snap shot of the GGobi interface for the connections of Thursday in the second 
training week. This figure shows that there exist certain patterns among the connections. 
Although we could learn some about the structure of the data points by observing the 
animation, it still is a good idea to reduce the number of variables for better view. Different 
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types of attacks require different visualization approaches to show what is going on in the 
network. 
To perform anomaly detection, it is necessary to know what normal network traffic 
looks like. The first two weeks of the Lincoln Laboratory data is attack free. We randomly 
choose one day as our starting point: Thursday of the first week. For the given dataset, the 
TCP connection records are extracted. In the preprocessing phase, all outgoing web traffic is 
discarded since it contributes little or nothing to detecting intrusions. 
-~l}:-f ~ !1,1)~ - -- - ------ - - - -- -- ------- _j 
Port scan 
Figure 2-2. A snap shot of GGobi grand tour for TCP connections in Thursday of week two. The bottom display 
shows the degree to which each variable participates in the 2D projection. The red points show a denial of 
service attack. The short dark blue lines show a port scan. 
Since the main characteristic of port scan is the large number of connections to the 
victim in a short time, we choose four variables: time, destination IP address, destination port 
number, the state of the connection. Time, destination IP address and destination port number 
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are assigned to three axes correspondingly. Colors represent the state of the connections. 
Each connection record is represented as a point in the four dimensional domain. 
Using the Scatter Visualizer tool of MineSet, Figure 2-3 shows the TCP connections 
of Thursday in the first week. 
Destination Ports 
Time 
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Figure 2-3. TCP connections of Thursday in week one with no attacks. Internet Relay Chat (IRC) data can be 
seen in the top right. The long line on the base represents traffic to a server. 
This figure tells a lot about how normal network traffic should behave: 1) the number 
of the network services is small and follows certain pattern. When it comes to everyday 
work, people tend to use the same service again and again. That's why most of traffic is Web 
Traffic, EMAIL, Telnet, FfP, IRC, etc. 2) when people are at work; the volume of network 
traffic is pretty large. This number drops dramatically after everyone goes home. The only 
exception is the machine that provides TELNET service. There are continuous connections 
for this service even at late night. 3) Most of the network connections are normal finished 
connections. This means that they follow the three-way handshaking connection 
establishment, exchange of packets, connection breakdown. 4) The server provides certain 
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service can be observed as the straight line along the time axis. When the server is busier, the 
line is denser. 
Then, what do the intrusions look like? To vividly show the difference, we take the 
traffic of Thursday in week two as our example. This day contains several attacks. Following 
the same approach as above, a three dimensional picture is shown in Figure 2-4. Comparing 
these figures, we can find some noticeable differences: One long blue vertical straight line 
along destination port axis appears in Figure 2-4. Besides, the color of this line is different 
from the color of those small destination port traffic points. This line is the result of the 
Neptune attack, which is a denial of service attack. This attack tries to establish as many half 
open TCP connections with the victim as possible. Instead of finding exact open service ports 
on the victim, the attacker just tries to connect to every port from 1 to 9999. Since no such 
ports are open on the victim, most of the connection attempts are rejected. That is the reason 
why they have different color, which means the state is "REJ". 
Destination Ports 
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Figure 2-4. TCP connections of Thursday in week two when attacks are being launched at the system. The 
vertical lines on the destination ports axis are different types of denial of service attack. 
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At the same time, there are two shorter blue vertical straight lines along destination 
port axis in Figure 2-4. Most of these connections are also in the state of "REJ". These two 
lines actually represent port scan attacks. The attackers attempt to find all open ports on the 
victim by scanning a large number of ports at the same. In this case, the port range is from 1 
to 1024. 
5. Fuzzy features fro intrusion detection 
5.1. Fuzzy features 
The features are used to describe the network state. Any deviation from the normal 
profile might be an indication of possible attacks. In principle, we can view any feature as 
"fuzzy" since fuzzy logic is an extension of Boolean logic. In practice, the separation of 
Boolean features and fuzzy features can simplify our system. For example, if the number of 
new servers is nonzero, there is a terrible threat to the system and an alert should be triggered 
immediately. The system administer should investigate whether it is due to Trojan horse 
attacks or users' installation of servers. Similar features include the number of new ARP 
packets, the number of wrong ARP packets, etc. The remaining quantitative features fall into 
the category of "fuzzy". The reason is due to the difficulty of using a unique threshold to 
classify them as normal or not. 
The fuzzy features are: 
• Number of TCP Connections 
• Number of Failed TCP Connections 
• Number of Destination Ports 
•Number of UDP Packets 
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•Number of ICMP packets 
• Number of Unreachable ICMP packets 
•Number of Bytes Sent per Connection 
•Number of Bytes Received per Connection 
5.2. Fuzzy sets 
For each fuzzy feature, we can define three fuzzy sets: LOW, MIDDLE and HIGH. 
At the same time, we should realize that the final decision of the intrusion detection is also a 
fuzzy decision. An alert is given if the network is abnormal, i.e. under attacks. To reduce 
false alarms, two fuzzy sets are defined for the status of network: ABNORMAL and 
NORMAL. Given these fuzzy sets, it is possible for us to define some fuzzy if-then rules to 
detect the existence of attacks. For example: 
IF the number of Failed TCP Connections is HIGH and the number of Unreachable 
ICMP packets is HIGH, then the network is ABNORMAL (DOS attack) 
IF the number of Failed TCP Connections is HIGH and the number of TCP 
Destination Port is HIGH, then the network is ABNORMAL (Probe attack) 
IF all fuzzy features are MIDDLE, THEN the network is NORMAL. 
The shapes of membership functions can also be learned by using Fuzzy C-means 
classification. [ 4] 
6. Fuzzy cognitive maps to explain intrusions 
Fuzzy cognitive maps can be used for data fusion of the individual features to detect 
complex attack scenarios that involve multiple steps [4]. Fuzzy cognitive maps are fuzzy 
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digraphs that model causal flow between concepts [13, 14]. The concepts are linked by edges 
that show the degree to which the concepts depend on each other. Figure 2-5 shows a sample 
fuzzy cognitive map for detecting complex situations such as an installed backdoor on a 
system or the hijacking of a system for distributed denial of service attacks. FCMs have 
causality directions that are +1, a positive causal connection, -1, a negative connection, or 
zero, no causal connection. The fuzzy structure allows the input levels to be expressed in the 
continuous range [0,1]. The system nonlinearly transforms the weighted input to each node 
using a threshold function or other nonlinear activation. 
Nodes stand for causal fuzzy sets where events occur to some degree. Edges stand for 
causal flow. The sign of an edge ( + or -) shows causal increase or decrease between nodes. 
The edges between nodes can also be time dependent functions that create a complex 
dynamical system. FCMs recall as the FCM dynamical system equilibrates. Simple FCM 
inference is matrix-vector multiplication followed by thresholding. State vectors Cn cycle 
through the FCM edge matrix E, that defines the edges ek; where k is the upstream node and 
i is the downstream node. The system nonlinearly transforms the weighted input to each 
nodeC;: 
S(y) is a monotonic signal function bounded function such as the sigmoid function. 
This network was tested using the DARPA 1999 evaluation data describe in section 2 
[6]. The attacks are directed at the system in no particular order. The inputs to the nodes of 
the FCM are fuzzified by applying a sigmoid function. The membership function starts at the 
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mean of the level from the training data and increases to a value of one at the mean plus two 
standard deviations. In order to make each input have a specified duration, each input node 
had a self-feedback edge that allowed an input to gradually fade away over durations of one, 
four, and twelve hours. 
Figure 2-5 . Fuzzy cognitive map for a distributed intrusion detection system. The blue ovals are the features 
measured by the intrusion detection agents. The pink ovals are the attack types. 
The intrusion fusion FCM correctly detected the different intrusion types such as 
scans, distributed denial of service attacks and the installation and use of a backdoor. The 
next step in the analysis will be to run the FCM against a scripted intrusion scenario that 
contains the phases of an actual attack. 
7. Conclusion 
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Visualization and feature analysis are powerful tools for selecting the proper fuzzy 
agents for an intrusion detection system. Future work will focus on the creation of adaptive 
fuzzy cognitive maps for characterizing network intrusions. 
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CHAPTER 3 FEATURE ANALYSIS AND 
VISUALIZATION FOR NETWORK ANOMALY 
INTRUSION DETECTION 
A paper will be submitted to IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 
Jianqiang Xin, John E. Dickerson, and Julie A. Dickerson 
Abstract 
A key part of an intrusion detection system is the selection of key features and time 
windows that can characterize the state of the networks. Feature selection methods such as 
Correlation Feature Selection analyze the good features for detecting network anomalies 
using the DARPA Lincoln Laboratory 1999 test data and the KDD data. Visual data mining 
methods for feature selection were also used to analyze the data and give a human operator 
better insight into the system. Refining the feature set gave more accurate classification. 
1. Introduction 
Serving as "burglar alarms" of the computer security field, modern computer systems, 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have proved their capability to identify malicious activity 
targeted at computing and networking resources. [ 1] 
The techniques of intrusion detection can be divided into two main types: misuse 
detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection is a signature-based approach that 
matches measured data against a database of known attacks. This approach has advantages of 
low false alarm and detailed information available for detected attacks. However, misuse 
detection systems have difficulty in detecting new or varied attacks that are not in the 
database. In addition, the signature databases require constant updates. Anomaly detection 
31 
works by alerting any activity that deviate from the normal behavior of the systems. This 
approach has the capability of detecting any new or unknown attacks as long as these attacks 
make the systems behave abnormally. Based on the monitored objects and data sources, IDSs 
can be classified into: host IDSs and network IDSs. Host IDSs monitor system, event and 
security logs of a single, while network IDSs keep track of the datagram traffic in a section of 
network. 
Network anomaly detection systems monitor a segment of a local area network 
(LAN) for any abnormal behavior. Reading the payloads of the packets is not appropriate for 
the network anomaly detector. First, faster network speed permits shorter processing time 
without package loss. Second, the wider use of encryption techniques renders the payload of 
the packages unreadable during transmission. So, the payloads of the packets are saved for 
host IDSs, which can better analyze the real impact of the payloads on the host. 
Denning [l] described a general-purpose intrusion detection expert model that was 
independent of any particular system, application environment, system vulnerability, or type 
of intrusion. The basic idea was to maintain a set of profiles for subjects. When an audit 
record is generated, the model matches it with the appropriate profile and then makes 
decisions on updating the profile, checking for abnormal behavior and reporting anomalies 
detected. This model lays the foundation for anomaly detection systems. This is the model 
used in the Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine (FIRE) system of Iowa State University[2, 
3]. 
Many projects continue to employ statistical methods for anomaly detection [4-10]. 
However, wider ranges of classification methods have been introduced into anomaly 
intrusion detection field. They include artificial neural networks[ll-13], fuzzy theory [2, 3, 
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14, 15], rule induction [16, 17], artificial immune systems [18, 19], signal processing 
methods [20], etc. 
Good feature selection is more important than the selection of a classifier. Good 
features will characterize data with a minimum amount of repetition providing substantial 
data reduction. Although our focus is on anomaly detection, the work can be applied to other 
types of intrusion detection. 
2. Background 
2.1. Lincoln Laboratory test data Sets 
Benchmarking of commercial and research IDSs is a necessary but daunting task due 
to the abundance of detection techniques and operating systems, letting alone privacy policy. 
The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) conducted consecutive 
offline evaluations of its intrusion detection projects consecutively in 1998 and 1999. [22] 
More complex attack scenarios were created in the 2000 evaluation [23]. It is still the most 
comprehensive offline evaluation of different intrusion detection systems. 
Lincoln Laboratory set up a controlled network environment containing hundreds of 
users and thousands of hosts. Custom software automata simulated programmers, secretaries, 
managers and other types of users running common UNIX and Windows NT application 
programs. More than 200 instances and 56 different types of attacks were embedded in the 
1999 evaluation. They fall into five major categories: [23] 
• Probe or scan attacks 
• Denial of service (DoS) attacks 
• Remote to Local (R2L) attacks 
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• User to root (U2R) attacks 
• Data attacks 
The data set is divided into two parts: training data and testing data. Three weeks of 
training data composed of two weeks of background traffic with no attacks and one week of 
background with a few attacks. The two weeks of testing data contained both old attacks that 
appeared in the training weeks and new attacks that only existed in the testing weeks. In 
addition, when an attempt was made to veil an attack, it was labeled as stealthy; otherwise it 
was labeled as clear. 
The participants of 1999 DARPA evaluation program have shown that header 
information of network traffic are effective in detecting probe attacks and denial of service 
attacks. [23] Host intrusion detection system utilizing system logs have a better chance to 
detect the remaining three types of attacks. However, we argue that network anomaly 
detector may detect remote to local attacks. A Remote to User attack occurs when an 
attacker who has the ability to send packets to a machine over a network but who does not 
have an account on that machine exploits some vulnerability to gain local access as a user of 
that machine. Some attacks exploit buffer overflows in network server software such as 
imap, named, sendmail, some attempt to exploit weak or rnisconfigured system security 
policies. A connection from an unusual host to a specific port of the host might be an 
indication of attempted penetration without inspection of payload data. 
2.2. Knowledge discovery and data mining tools competition 
dataset 
This data set was used for the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data 
Mining Tools Competition with its origin from 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation 
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Program. A test bed was set up to simulate a LAN of an air base. The raw training data was 
about four gigabytes of compressed binary TCP dump data from seven weeks of network 
traffic. Five weeks' data were used as training data while the remaining two weeks were for 
testing. 
Attacks fall into four main categories: 
• DOS: denial-of-service 
• R2L: unauthorized access from a remote machine 
• U2R: unauthorized access to local super user 
• Probing 
Stolfo et al. [17] defined higher-level features extracting from TCP connections to 
distinguish normal connections from attacks. The total number of features was 41, 14 of 
which were derived from the contents of the connection packets. Examples include whether 
the connection obtained a root shell, the number of file creation operations. Each record in 
the data set stands for a connection. The objective of the competition was to classify whether 
the record was normal or not. The data set that we use was a 10% subset of the full data set. 
The training data set has 494021 records and the testing data set has 311029 records. 
2.3. Related work 
P.A. Porras and A.Valdes organize network packets into streams based on different 
isolation criteria such as discarded traffic, pass-through traffic, protocol-specific traffic, etc. 
[24]. Four classes of features were adapted to track network status: categorical, continuous, 
intensity and event distribution. These features are employed in both anomaly detection and 
signature detection. Their work provided some general guidance for the choice of features. 
However, they did not mention the performance of these features. 
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The Network Security Monitor (NSM) modeled the network and hosts in a 
hierarchically structured Interconnected Computing Environment Model (ICBM) [25] The 
ICBM is composed of six layers: packet layer, thread layer, connection layer, host layer, 
connected-network layer and system layer. They listed the features for connection layer and 
host layer. Lee used neural networks to implement anomaly detection. [11] He gave a list of 
features for the detections of SYN flood, fast SYN port scan and "stealthy" SYN port scan. 
Dickerson [14] gives a long list of features extracted from TCP, UDP and ICMP. 
These simple features might not be enough. It is better to consider the relationship 
between the simple features such as frequency episode, association rules. That is the reason 
why data mining technologies have been introduced into intrusion detection field. In Lee and 
Stolf o's work [ 17], they combined the features derived from frequency episodes and intrinsic 
connection features. But their model is based on misuse detection. Audit Data Analysis and 
Mining (ADAM) system is a anomaly detection system which used a combination of 
association rules mining and classification to discover attacks in a TCPDUMP audit trail 
[26]. One of the remaining problems is that they cannot detect attacks with small number of 
packets. 
No one gives a complete analysis of why should choose the features. Nor has anyone 
benchmark the performance of the different features. How will the features influence the 
performance? 
3. Approach 
3.1. Data sources 
Network intrusion detection relies mainly on network traffic. To capture the network 
activity, some agents are installed to sniff the traffic from the wire. The agents can be placed 
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both inside and outside the local network. Outside traffic can give more insight into the 
attacks from the Internet while inside traffic is good at detecting insider attacks. Lincoln 
Laboratory data sets have both outside and inside network traffic available in TCPDUMP 
format. In this work, the outside network traffic was chosen. And the payload information is 
discarded for faster processing and privacy concern. 
The intrusion detection systems might detect the attacks in real-time mode or offline 
mode. Real-time detection has the disadvantages of heavy computation and low detection 
rate due to incomplete information. This work can be placed somewhere between real time 
detection and off-line detection. The features from the network traffic gathered in last W 
seconds to classify the state of the system during that period. A smaller W means shorter 
delay, while a larger W might improve the detection rate. 
Since probes and denial of service attacks usually generate large amounts of network 
traffic in a short period, these attacks can be detected by the number of events within a time 
window. The time interval in our experiments is chosen to be 2 minutes. 
3.2. Data pre-processing 
For each IP datagram, the header information was checked to verify its integrity. 
These checks include whether source IP address is same as the destination IP address, 
whether source IP address or destination IP address falls into the reserved IP, etc. The 
number of IP datagram and bytes in the time windows was also recorded. 
So, for TCP packets, we use Bro tool to extract each connection [11]. Some 
changes were made to the source codes of Bro in order to replace service with destination 
port. The format of Bro analyzer output is as the following: 
<start> <duration> <destination port> Bo Br Al Ar <state> 
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TABLE 3-1 shows the meaning of every field. 
For UDP packages and ICMP packages, each one is dealt as a connection. 
TABLE 3-1. The meanings of TCP connection fields 
Name Meaning 
Start the connection's start time 
Duration the connection's duration 
destination port the destination port of the connection, generally an indication of service 
Bo, Br the number of bytes sent by the originator and responder 
the local and remote addresses that 
Az, Ar participated in the connection 
respectively 
State the state of the connection at the time the summary was written. 
3.3. Features 
We have derived four classes of features based on our preprocessed results. They are 
listed in TABLE 3-11. 
• Packet level features. These features analyze the individual IP packet to detect 
the malformed packets. 
• Network traffic density features. These features keep track of the network 
flow density such as the bytes transmitted during an interval. They are good at 
analyzing DoS attacks. Example are the number of bytes for all network 
traffic, number of UDP packets,etc. 
• Protocol specific features. These features keep track of the packets for 
different protocols. Currently, we analyze TCP, UDP, ICMP (Internet Control 
Message Protocol). TCP traffic is analyzed on the basis of connections while 
UDP and ICMP packets are treated as simple connection. Examples are 
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Number of TCP connections, Number of Outgoing TCP connections, Number 
of failed TCP connections, etc. 
TABLE 3-II. Feature candidate list 
No Name Meaning 
1 time Start time of each time window 
2 TCPConns # of TCP connections 
3 TCPOutConns # of Outgoing TCP connections 
4 TCPFailedConns # of failed TCP connections 
5 TCPNormalFConns # of normal finished TCP connections 
6 TCPSrcIPs # of source IPs of TCP connections 
7 TCPDestIPs # of destination IPs of TCP connections 
8 TCP Services # of destination Ports of TCP connections 
9 All Traffic # of bytes of all network traffic 
10 In Traffic # of bytes of Incoming network traffic 
11 OutTraffic # of bytes of Outgoing network traffic 
12 TCPPkts # of TCP packets 
13 TCPinPkts # of Incoming TCP packets 
14 TCPOutPkts # of outgoing TCP packets 
15 TCPBytes # of bytes in TCP 
16 TCPinBytes # of bytes in incoming TCP 
17 TCPOutBytes # of bytes in outgoing TCP 
18 AbnormalPackets # of abnormal IP packets 
19 TCP SYN # of TCP packets with SYN flag 
20 TCPFIN # of TCP packets with FIN flag 
21 TCPREJ # of TCP packets with REJ falg 
22 NTCPSdps #ofTCP sdps 
23 NTCPNewSdps # of new TCP sdps 
24 NTCPServers # of TCP servers 
25 NTCPNewServers # of new TCP servers 
26 UDPPkts # of UDP packets 
27 UDPinPkts # of UDP incoming packets 
28 UDPOutPkts # of UDP Outgoing packets 
29 UDPBytes # of bytes in UDP 
30 UDPinBytes # of bytes in incoming UDP 
31 UDPOutBytes # of bytes in outcoming UDP 
32 UDPSrcIPs # of source IPs of UDP 
33 UDPDestIPs # of Destination IPs of UDP 
34 UDPSrcPorts # of source ports of UDP 
35 UDPDestPorts # of destination ports of UDP 
36 ICMPS # of ICMP packets 
37 ICMPReplys # of ICMP replies 
38 ICMPRequests # ofICMP requests 
39 ICMPUnreachables # of ICMP unreachable 
40 ICMPFrags # of fragmented ICMPs 
41 ICMPSDs # of ICMP source destination IP pairs 
42 ARPWrongAdrs # of ARP with wrong address 
43 ARPNewAdrs # of ARP with new address 
39 
• Correlation features: A network connection generally consists of two hosts 
and two ports. This information should be combined for each TCP connection. 
SDP = (source IP address, Destination IP address, Destination port) 
SERVER= (Destination IP address, Destination port) 
For a SERVER to exist connection must be established and data are 
exchanged. This does not apply to SDP. 
During the training weeks, a database was built to collect all available SDP and 
SERVER. When it comes to testing weeks, new SDP or SERVER is a strong indication of 
anomaly. By using these two parameters, we define several features such as the number of 
SDPs, the number of new SDPs, the number of SERVERs, the number of new SDPs. 
3.4. Feature selection 
"The curse of dimensionality" makes dimension reduction necessary. This problem is 
illustrated by the number of features in TABLE 3-II. There are two kinds of methods to 
reduce dimension while preserving as much information as necessary. Transforming the data 
from a high dimensionality to a low dimensional space is one approach while the other 
approach is to remove the irrelevant or redundant features from the space. By reducing the 
noise from the data, it is possible to build a simpler model with better performance. 
Feature selection methods have been studied widely by machine learning community. 
Existing feature selection methods for machine learning typically fall into two broad 
categories: filters and wrappers.[27] 
40 
Figure 3-1 . Filters for feature selection 
3.4.1. Filter methods 
Filter methods evaluate the worth of features by using heuristic based on general 
characteristics of the data. Figure 3-1 illustrates the filter approach. Various heuristic and 
search scheme result in many different filters. Among these methods, correlation feature 
selection (CFS) is gaining more attention due to its simplicity and effectiveness. 
CFS adopts a correlation-based heuristic to evaluate subsets of features and is based 
on the following hypothesis[27]: 
A good feature subset is one that contains features highly correlated with (predictive 
of) the class, yet uncorrelated with (not predictive of) each other. 
CFS' s feature subset evaluation function is defined as: 
krcf 
M = ---;=:==== 
s ~ k + ( k - 1 )r ff 
where Ms is the heuristic "merit" of a feature subset S containing k features, ref is the 
average feature-class correlation and rff is the average feature-feature inter correlation. 
41 
Intuitively, the numerator of this equation provides a measure of how predictive the subset of 
features is and the denominator provides a measure of how much redundancy there is in this 
feature subset. 
At preprocessing stage, all non-nominal features are discretized. Then, any measures 
of association between nominal variables can be employed to calculate the feature-class 
correlation and feature-feature inter-correlations such as symmetrical uncertainty and 
minimum description length. 
3.4.2. Wrapper methods 
Unlike filters, wrappers use an induction algorithm along with a cross-validation to 
estimate the final accuracy of feature subsets. Figure 3-2 is the diagram of wrapper method. 
It can be used to cope with many classification methods such as decision trees, instance 
based classifiers, etc. 
Wrappers often give better result than filters because features selection is optimized 
for the particular learning algorithm used. But it has the disadvantages of expensive 
computation cost, learning algorithm dependence. Filters execute much faster than wrappers 
and do not require re-execution for different learning algorithms. 
3.5. Classifiers 
Classifiers are also an important component of the system. In order to verify the 
effectiveness of our features selection, we have chosen several different classifiers to testify 
the performance of the features. 
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Figure 3-2. Wrappers for feature selection 
3.5.1. K-Nearest neighbors 
K-nearest neighbor classifier is one of the simplest methods. Yet it proved to be 
strong and useful. During learning stage, it saves all training instances without doing 
anything. When a new instance is given for classification, the "distance" between it and 
every training instance is computed. The K closest matches are identified and the new 
instance is labeled as the majority of the its "nearest neighbors". 
3.5.2. Alternating decision tree 
The alternating decision tree [32] is a generation of decision trees, voted decision 
trees and voted decision stumps. It is competitive with boosted decision tree algorithms and 
generates rules that are usually smaller in size and easier to interpret. 
3.5.3. Bayes classifier 
The naive Bayes algorithm employs a simplified version of Bayes formula to decide 
which class a novel instance belongs to. The posterior probability of each class is calculated, 
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given the feature values present in the instance, the instance is assigned the class with the 
highest probability. 
3.5.4. Multilayer perceptron 
Neural networks have been used widely as classifier. Multilayer perceptron can be 
used to approximate any function. Here, we used a three-layer perceptron with one hidden 
layer. The number of neurons in the hidden layer is half of the number of features. 
3.5.5. Profile based classifier 
A profile is build for each feature, once the feature of new data falls outside of the 
permitted ranges, it means something wrong might happen. 
3.6. Visual data mining 
One open problem with existing IDS is false alarms. When an alert emerges, the 
system administrators must check the log files of IDS, various servers, routers, network 
traffic, etc. So much information makes this process like drinking from a fire hose. The 
methods to visually summarize the information can provide the system administrators with a 
quick overview of the system. Analyzing log results is inherently a perceptually serial 
process. Interpretation of graphical images, on the other hand, is perceptually a parallel 
process [34]. Parallel processes can save both effort and time in comparison with serial 
processes. Thus, the use of graphical images has edges over observing individual reports. 
Another advantage is that more "concepts" can be presented in a single image. A good 
visualization picture can convey the same information in more compactly and save a great 
deal of time and energy for the security personnel. The challenge is to create visual methods 
that clearly show the problem without losing vital information. 
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Our work investigates the visualization of network intrusions by showing key 
features. The data source is the sniffed network traffic in TCPDUMP format from 1999 
Lincoln Laboratory. MineSet [33] and GGobi [34] provide excellent tools for the 
visualization purpose. 
4. Feature analysis and classification result for 1999 
Lincoln Laboratory data set 
4.1. Feature preparation 
The first three week of 1999 Lincoln Laboratory data set were used as training data. 
The first and third weeks do not contain any attacks. We used these two weeks to establish 
our database of SDP's and SERVER's for the normal network. The time window is chosen to 
be equal to 2 minutes without any overlap. At the same time, the profiles for each feature are 
also saved. Each profile starts from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. of next day. The profiles are 
initially empty and features are added at the specific time window to the empty profiles if 
there are no attacks. Since the Lincoln library does not provide the exact duration of attacks 
in the second week, this information was manually added into the database by analyzing the 
network traffic. The processed results of the first three weeks form the training set and the 
test set uses the data from the fourth and fifth weeks. 
4.2. Classification performance 
There are 43 features and one class label. For each time window, the classifier 
decides which class this instance belongs to: normal or abnormal. 
We experimented with five classifiers: Alternative decision tree, KNN, Bayesian 
classifier, multilayer perceptron and profile based classifier. All the classifiers are trained at 
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first, and then the test data is used to check their performance. Here, we employed all 43 
features. The best results from each classifier are given in Figure 3-3. Alternating decision 
tree gives the best results of detect rate at 57% and the false alarm rate of only 8%. Although 
the Bayesian approach and neural network classifier gave a higher detection rates, their false 
alarms rates were too high to accept. The fact that there were fewer attacks than normal 
traffic in the test data reminds us to pay close attention to false alarms. The ratio between 
attack instance and no-attack instance is about 1:9. 
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Figure 3-3. Different Classifier Performance Comparison 
4.3. Feature selection 
Proper feature selection greatly saves computation cost, space and even improves the 
performance of classifier by removing the redundant features. This analysis used both the 
training and testing data sets. 
Between the two general methods to select features, filtering methods are easy to 
implement. We first tried correlation based feature selection method. Since there are several 
different search approaches for this method and other filtering methods. We experimented 
with different search methods. The result of genetic selection is the same as the first 6 
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features of forward selection. In fact, we can see the result of best first and rank search are 
just a subset of the forward selection with different order. Experiments show that different 
search methods generated the similar results. 
Apart from CFS method, there are also several other filtering methods. In our 
experiments, we applied Information Gain, Gain ratio, Symmetrical Uncertainty, Chi squared 
attributes. These results are shown in TABLE 3-Ill. Only first 10 significant results are 
presented. Comparing them, we find most of them are the same with minor difference. 
Features such as number of new TCP SDPs, number of TCP outgoing connection, appear in 
all results. But feature 40 only appears in gain ratio methods and was not selected by any 
other method. 
Since wrapper methods are very computation extensive, we only experimented with 
two wrappers: wrapper with Alternative decision tree and wrapper with Bayes classifier. The 
top 10 features are shown in TABLE 3-111. 
TABLE 3-III. Different filter and wrapper results 
Filter Method Search Result 
Information Gain 23,3,2,22,8, 7,24,5,21, 19 
Gain Ratio 25,40,23,4,38,21,5,3,2,7 
Symmetrical 23,25,4,21,5,3,2,7,22,8 Uncertainty 
Chi Squared Attribute 23,3,2,22,21,8,25,5,4,24 
OneR 23,3,2,25,21,22,4,5,8,24 
Wrapper with Adtree 23,41,2,35,26,7,21,34,13,40 
Wrapper with Bayes 3,38,41,5,26,39,13,40,29,l6 
After coming all the results together, the top 10 features include 8 TCP features and 2 
ICMP features. The main reason for this phenomenon is that most of the attacks use TCP 
protocols. We list our top ten features in TABLE 3-IV. 
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TABLE 3-IV Ten best features 
No Feature name 
23 NTCPNewSdps 
3 TCPOutConns 
25 NTCPNewServers 
4 TCPFailedConns 
38 ICMPRequests 
41 ICMPSDs 
32 UDPSrcPorts 
26 UDPPkts 
18 AbnormalPackets 
42 ARPWrongAdrs 
To verify the performance of our selected features, the same classifiers are used with 
the new sets of features. The result is shown in Figure 3-4. 
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Figure 3-4. Different Classifier Performance Comparison for selected features 
The performance of Adtree remains the best. For KNN, the false alarm rate is reduced 
from 0.27 to 0.10 and the detection rate is reduced from 0.51 to 0.45. Although the detection 
rate of Bayesian method and multiplayer perceptron lowered a bit, their false alarms are 
reduced greatly: almost IA of original ones. Overall, the correct classification rate is 
improved. This shows that the feature list really represents the significant features. 
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4.4. Overlap and window size effect 
In theory, the time window should be large enough to catch enough information to 
make a decision. Longer time windows contain more information. A long window will cause 
a delay in detection. 
Another problem is the overlaps between the time windows. How large is enough? 
Generally, there is no answer. We did some experiment to provide some insights into the 
choice of these two variables. 
Starting the time window of 120 seconds and changing the overlap from 0 to 0.8, we 
experiment with our new feature list. The result is shown in Figure 3-5. The result is very 
interesting. It shows that the detect rate increases a bit as the overlap portion increases. 
However, the false alarm also increases with the overlap. Anyway, the increased amount is 
rather trivial. 
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Figure 3-5. The relationship between overlap portion and performance 
Next, we keep the overlap ratio to be constant as 0.4 and change the time window 
length. The result is shown in Figure 3-6. The detection rate increases steadily with the time 
window length and the amount becomes smaller as time window increase. The false alarms 
rate will increase at first and then almost remain constant. 
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Figure 3-6. Relationship between the window length and classifier performance 
4.5. Attacks detected and missed 
Adopting the window length of 120 seconds without any overlap, we carried out the 
experiment again. The results are shown in TABLE 3-V. The classifier was AdTree. 
TABLE 3-V shows that the classifier can detect most of the attacks that they are 
capable of detecting. The features perform extremely well for remote to local attacks. There 
are only two types of attacks that the features completely missed: insidersniffer and 
dictionary. For insidersniffer attack, the attacker is on the inside and attaches a new machine 
to an inside Ethernet hub, configured with an IP and sniffed traffic. This is extremely 
difficult to detect. Another missed attack are dictionary attack which the attacker tried to 
guess the password using a dictionary. The reason why we missed it is due to the stealthy 
mode of the attack. Reading the payload to find login error is a better choice for detecting 
this type of attacks. 
5. Feature analysis and classification result for KDD 
dataset 
5.1. Classifier performance 
KDD dataset has already defined 41 features, which are shown in 
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From the figure, we can see that alternating decision tree performs well for the 
datasets. The detection rate is around 0.99 and the false alarm is below 0.11. As the level of 
the trees increase, higher detection rate and lower false alarm are achieved. Even when the 
level of the tree is one, we can get a detection rate of 0.978 and false alarm of 0.109. In 
Figure 3-7, we show the alternating tree of level one. This means that feature count alone can 
TABLE 3-VI. All features were used and the classifier was Alternating Decision tree. 
The alternating decision tree is built from the training data and the performance is verified by 
the testing data. Figure 3-7 shows the relationship between the performance and the level of 
decision tree. 
TABLE 3-V. Attack Detection performance 
Attack All instance Some instances detected Total Category detected missed 
Apache2, arpposison, back, 
Denial of Land crashii, dosnuke, mailbomb, 
Service neptune ping of death, processtable, 
Attacks selfping, smurf, sshprocesstable, syslogd, 
tcpreset, teardrop, udpstorm 
Ls_domain, ntinfoscan, Ipsweep, mscan Probes nmap, queso, resetscan, Insidesniffer 
satan 
Remote to named, netbus, phf, 
Local ppmarco, SendMail, Ftpwrite, guest , httptunnel, Dictionary 
Attacks sshtrojan, Xlock, imap, ncftp, netcat Xsnoop 
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Figure 3-7. The alternating tree of level one. The sum of weight is positive: abnormal; otherwise: normal. 
From the figure, we can see that alternating decision tree performs well for the 
datasets. The detection rate is around 0.99 and the false alarm is below 0.11. As the level of 
the trees increase, higher detection rate and lower false alarm are achieved. Even when the 
level of the tree is one, we can get a detection rate of 0.978 and false alarm of 0.109. In 
Figure 3-7, we show the alternating tree of level one. This means that feature count alone can 
TABLE 3-VI. Feature list for KDD 1999 data set 
No Feature name Description Type 
1 duration Length of the connection c 
2 protocol_type Type of the protocol D 
3 service Network service on the destination D 
4 src_bytes # of data bytes from source c 
5 dst_bytes # of data bytes from destination c 
6 flag Status of the connection D 
7 land Connection from/to same host/port D 
8 wrong_fragment # of" wrong" fragments c 
9 urgent # of urgent packets c 
10 hot # of "hot" indicators c 
11 num_failed_logins # of failed login attempts c 
12 logged_in successfully logged in or not D 
13 num_compromised # of "compromised" conditions c 
14 root_shell root shell is obtained or not D 
15 Su_attempted "su root" attempted or not D 
16 num_root # of "root" accesses c 
17 num_file_creations # of file creation operations c 
18 num_shells # of shell prompts c 
19 num_access_files # of operations on access control files c 
20 Num_outbound_cmds # of outbound commands in an ftp session c 
21 is_hot_login Whether login belongs to "hot'" list D 
22 Is_guest_login Whether login is a "guest"' login D 
23 Count # of connection to same host as current connection c 
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in the past two seconds 
24 serror_rate % of connections having "SYN" errors c 
25 rerror_rate % of connections that have "REJ" errors c 
26 same_srv _rate % of connections to same service c 
27 diff_srv _rate % of connections to different services c 
28 Srv_count number of connections to same service as current c connection in the past two seconds 
29 Srv _serror_rate % of connections that have "SYN" errors c 
30 Srv _rerror_rate % of connections having "REJ" errors c 
31 srv _diff_host_rate % of connections to different hosts c 
32 dst_host_count 
33 dst_host_srv _count 
34 dst_host_same_srv _rate 
35 dst_host_diff_srv _rate 
36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate 
37 dst_host_srv _diff_host_rate 
38 dst_host_serror_rate 
39 dst_host_srv _serror_rate 
40 dst_host_rerror_rate 
41 dst_host_srv _rerror_rate 
detect most of the attacks with a low false alarm. As the tree grows larger with more levels 
and leafs, it is more computation expensive and complex. We choose our optimal result to be 
the alternating decision tree with 12 levels. It has detection rate of 0.99 and the lowest false 
alarm 0.085. 
5.2. Feature selection 
From the above experiment, it is evident that not all 41 features are necessary for the 
classification task. We can greatly reduce the computation expense select the optimal feature 
subset. 
The methods that we employed include CFS, Information Gain, Gain ratio, 
Symmetrical Uncertainty, Chi squared attributes and alternative decision based method. All 
the feature selection techniques that we used belong to filter categories. The reason why 
wrapper methods are not attempted is due to their computation cost. These methods gave us 
the similar results with minor differences. We can get the final result by combining these 
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results. The optimal feature subset is shown in TABLE 3-VIIT ABLE 3-VIL Optimal Feature 
Subset. 
TABLE 3-VIL Optimal Feature Subset 
Feature No Feature 
23 Count 
31 Srv _diff_host_rate 
12 Logged_in 
6 Dst_bytes 
5 Src_bytes 
3 Service 
37 Dst_host_srv _diff_host 
32 Dst_host_count 
2 Protocol_ type 
31 Srv _diff_host_rate 
5.3. Feature selection performance 
After the feature selection, we built alternating decision tree from the training data. 
The performance remains intact and the training time is greatly reduced. This shows the 
advantage of our feature selection. 
Since the dataset contain denial of service and probe attacks, which usually generate a 
large amount of network connection in a short time. It is not strange that feature count (the 
number of connection in the past two seconds) is among the subsets. The features dst_bytes 
and src_bytes indicate the intensity of network traffic. They are good indication for denial of 
service attacks. 
6. Visual data mining result 
6.1. The approach 
For some attacks, network traffic the network state deviates from the normal state. A 
simple comparison between normal network states with the abnormal one will reveal that 
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something is wrong. For example, denial of service attacks will generate a large amount of 
network traffic in a short time span. 
Only TCP packets are considered at present. It is meaningful to analyze TCP packets 
in the units of connections instead of separate packets. Bro is an open-source tool for generic 
connection analysis [35]. All the TCP packets are extracted into TCP connections that have 
eight fields: 
Time, Duration, Flag, State, 
Bytes from source to destination, 
Bytes from destination to source, 
Source IP, Destination IP 
One obvious way is to display all eight dimensional data into a single picture. The 
grand tour in GGobi gives a continuous animation of the projections of 8-dimensional space 
to 2-D space. Figure 3-8 gives a snap shot of the GGobi interface for the connections of 
Thursday in the second training week. This figure shows that there exist certain patterns 
among the connections. 
:__;~i ,,.Jh M ----------- - -- -----------
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Figure 3-8. A snap shot of GGobi grand tour fro TCP connections in Thursday of week two. The bottom 
display shows the degree to which each variable participates in the 2D projection. The red points show a denial 
of service attack. The short dark blue lines show a port scan. 
Although we could learn some about the structure of the data points by observing the 
animation, it still is a good idea to reduce the number of variables for better view. It helps a 
lot knowing what normal network traffic looks like. The first two weeks of the Lincoln 
Laboratory data is attack free. We randomly choose one day as our starting point: Thursday 
of the first week. For the given dataset, the TCP connection records are extracted. In the 
preprocessing phase, all outgoing web traffic is discarded since it contributes little or nothing 
to detecting intrusions. Since the main characteristic of port scan is the large number of 
connections to the victim in a short time, we choose four variables: time, destination IP 
address, destination port number, the state of the connection. Time, destination IP address 
and destination port number are assigned to three axes correspondingly. Colors represent the 
state of the connections. Each connection record is represented as a point in the four 
dimensional domain. 
Using the Scatter Visualizer tool of MineSet, Figure 3-9 shows the TCP connections 
of Thursday in the first week. This figure tells a lot about how normal network traffic should 
behave: 1) The number of the network services is small and follows certain pattern. When it 
comes to everyday work, people tend to use the same service again and again. That's why 
most of traffic is Web Traffic, EMAIL, Telnet, FTP, IRC, etc. 2) When people are at work, 
56 
the volume of network traffic is pretty large. This number drops dramatically after everyone 
goes home. The only exception is the machine that provides TELNET service. There are 
continuous connections for this service even at late night. 3) Most of the network connections 
are normal finished connections. This means that they follow the three-way handshaking 
connection establishment, exchange of packets, connection breakdown. 4) The server 
provides certain service can be observed as the straight line along the time axis. When the 
server is busier, the line is denser. 
~MM ~ 
.~~
Destination Ports 
Time 
ff~fl~..,f~ V".il'f 
~rrztyr;C<lm-~mJi1t'.(1"<~119tfillW - - ~--~~~~ --- ------
Figure 3-9. TCP connections of Thursday in week one with no attacks. 
Then, what do the intrusions look like? To vividly show the difference, we take the 
traffic of Thursday in week two as our example. This day contains several attacks. Following 
the same approach as above, a three dimensional picture is shown in Figure 3-10. Comparing 
these figures, we can find some noticeable differences: One long blue vertical straight line 
along destination port axis appears in Figure 3-10. Besides, the color of this line is different 
from the color of those small destination port traffic points. This line is the result of the 
Neptune attack, which is a denial of service attack. This attack tries to establish as many half 
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open TCP connections with the victim as possible. Instead of finding exact open service ports 
on the victim, the attacker just tries to connect to every port from 1 to 9999. Since no such 
ports are open on the victim, most of the connection attempts are rejected. That is the reason 
why they have different color, which means the state is "REJ". 
At the same time, there are two shorter blue vertical straight lines along destination 
port axis in Figure 3-10. Most of these connections are also in the state of "REJ". These two 
lines actually represent port scan attacks. The attackers attempt to find all open ports on the 
victim by scanning a large number of ports at the same. In this case, the port range is from 1 
to 1024. 
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Figure 3-10. TCP connections of Thursday in week two when attacks are being launched at the system. The 
vertical lines on the destination ports axis are different types of denial of service attack. 
6.2. Informing system administrators 
The above approach is good at showing some obvious attacks such as denial of 
service, non-stealth probe attacks. When it comes to other types of attacks, especially some 
attacks with small number of packets, the method does not work well. Our feature analysis 
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came to rescue. We can obviously draw our optimal feature selection in a picture too see if 
everything is fine or not. One technique is to draw a time series figures for the features. 
Figure 3-11 gives the time series figure for the optimal TCP features in Friday of the 
first week. There is no attack at all. That's the reason why most features are equal to zero. 
The time line starts from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. of next day. A TCPOutConns feature gives 
us a basic idea of network density. 
The time series figure for Friday of the fifth week is shown in Figure 3-12. From this 
figure, we can see that a lot of things go wrong during the day. The occurrence of new 
servers and new TCP SDPs always indicates some serious things have happened. More often, 
it is due to remote to local attacks. The small cluster of abnormal packets is indication of 
attacks such as land or ping of death. The figure gives the system administrator a brief but 
accurate account when and why anomaly occurs. The system administrator can investigate 
further for the extent of the damage. 
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Figure 3-11. Time series figure for Friday of the first week 
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Figure 3-12. Time series figure for Friday of the fifth week 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we applied feature selection methods to network intrusion detection 
problem. Experimenting with different methods with 1999 Lincoln laboratory data set and 
1999 KDD dataset, we find that we could improve the performance of the classifier by 
selecting the optimal features. This also has the advantages of reduced computation cost, less 
storage requirement and faster response time. The feature selection methods good for this 
application included correlation feature selection techniques. Alternating decision tree proved 
to be an efficient, accurate classifier. 
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The paper also investigates visualization techniques for intrusion detection. Ggobi 
and Mineset are two excellent tools for high-dimensional visualization. One technique is to 
shown extracted TCP connections in 3 dimensional space. It provides a way to detect denial 
of services attacks, non-stealthy probe attacks. For other types of attacks, a simple time series 
of optimal features can vividly show them. 
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